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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ence, will conduct the entire course of litigation from initiation to
judgment, including all interlocutory motions, in specially assigned
cases. With the exception of those matters which are not suited for
disposition in this manner, e.g., proceedings under the Mental Hygiene
Law requiring judicial attendance at hospitals, the cases allocated to
the Individual Calendar Parts will be selected so as to represent a
cross-section of all matters going before the court.
Because of the experimental nature of the project, the procedures
to be followed by the attorney will not be exactly the same as in the
past. For example, the First Department has instituted a method for
filing of process together with a short statement regarding the nature of
the cause of action. In this manner, the judges will be better equipped
to control the action from its inception. Additionally, although specific
rules remain to be formulated, the First Department has afforded the
judges assigned to the Individual Calendar Parts wide discretion in
devising new methods of calendar disposition. Thus, it is anticipated
that regulations designed solely for the operation of a multi-judge court
will be dispensed with, provided that a substantial right of a party is
not prejudiced thereby.
The pilot project is to remain in force for at least one year, at
which time an evaluation of its results, particularly in terms of speed
and number of dispositions, will be made. If the project proves supe-
rior to that currently in effect, its general application in the First
Department will be indicated; if not, it will be abandoned. Ultimately,
the project is intended as a means of securing maximum use of judicial
manpower. Simultaneously, the introduction of expeditious procedures
will reduce the time and effort of the practitioner. Accordingly, the
Bar is encouraged to familiarize itself with the provisions of the First
Department's order so that the forthcoming year will provide a fair
estimation of whether the plan should be generally adopted.
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Cases illustrate elusiveness of "transacts business"
criteria.
In Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.
2
the Court of Appeals stated: "In enacting section 302, the Legislature
chose not to fix precise guidelines .... ',3 Two recent cases concerning
215 N.Y.2d 443, 209 NXE.2d 68, 261 N.YS.2d 8, cert. denied, 882 US. 905 (1965).
3Id. at 456, 209 NX.2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18. The advisory committee took
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CPLR 302(a)(1) 4 demonstrate that the courts will abide by the legis-
lative intent to keep the guidelines flexible, if not elusive.
In Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. American Champion5 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was called upon to determine
whether a London-based corporation, offering various types of freight
service, had transacted any business in New York. The corporation,
W. Wingate & Johnson (W&J), was a codefendant in three separate
actions which were decided in one opinion. 6 In the American Champion
and Rubens cases, goods were delivered to W&J for shipment to New
York. W&J thereupon issued forwarders bills of lading, consolidated
the goods in containers with goods of other shippers, sealed the con-
tainers and delivered them to a carrier. In the third case, American
Chieftain, the goods delivered to W&J were enough to fill an entire
container. W&J packed the goods and delivered them to a carrier
but did not issue a bill of lading. In all three cases, shortages were
discovered at the time of delivery.
Although the court could cite no authority expressly holding that
a British ocean carrier delivering cargo in New York would fall within
the ambit of CPLR 302(a)(1), it did find "strong" suggestions of such
a result.7 Thus, if W&cJ's conduct could be equated to that of a British
ocean carrier, it would satisfy the transaction of business requirements
since a carrier stands in a different position from that of a mere
shipper." The court held that W&J was transacting business in the
American Champion and Rubens cases because it did not undertake
"simply to arrange for transportation ... but to effect it." However,
a different result was reached in American Chieftain inasmuch as the
goods were shipped to Boston.10
cognizance of sister-state provisions which do employ strict guidelines but chose instead
the broad language currently in effect. See SECOND REP. 39-40.
4 CPLR 302(a)(1) provides that "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . .who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business
within the state."
5 426 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'g 300 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
6 The three cases were entitled Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. American
Champion (American Champion); Metasco, Inc. v. S.S. American Chieftain (American
Chieftain); and Metasco, Inc. v. S.S. Rubens (Rubens).
7 426 F.2d at 209, citing Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1965) and Ingravallo v. Pool Shipping Co., 247 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
S See Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966). For a
discussion of the "mere shipment rule," see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary
at 122 (1966).
9 426 F.2d at 210.
10 Because the goods were shipped to Boston, the court did not rule on whether
W&J's conduct was equivalent to that of a carrier. However, from the tenor of the opinion
it could be speculated that W&J's activities in American Chieftain did not venture beyond
those of a mere shipper.
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Where the district court had erred, in the opinion of Judge
Friendly, was in failing to distinguish between two different types
of forwarders: the first merely arranges for the transportation of the
goods, while the second not only arranges the transportation, but also
agrees to deliver the goods safely to the consignee. 1 In the first two
cases, W&J's activities went so far as to approximate those of a carrier.
In contrast to the Second Circuit's opinion in Aquascutum is the
rather conservative stance taken by the Court of Appeals in Ferrante
Equipment Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp.'2 There, the defendant's
surety sought indemnification on its performance bond from the fourth-
party defendant (Ferrante) after the defendant had defaulted in its
performance. The indemnification agreement was executed in New
Jersey and Ferrante had not entered New York for any purposes related
to the agreement. Nevertheless, the agreement did cover work to be
performed in New York and Ferrante derived commercial benefits
from the contract. Additionally, it was apparent that defendant would
not have been able to obtain the performance bond without assurances
on Ferrante's part.
Since it was conceded that all of Ferrante's activities occurred in
New Jersey, the Court narrowed the issue to "whether the language
of CPLR 302(a)(1) covers the case of a nonresident who never comes
to our State, but whose actions in his home State affect the performance
of work by others in New York."'13 The Court was unwilling to
answer this question in the affirmative.
The opinions in Aquascutum and Ferrante, perhaps, add little by
way of defining "transacts any business," but they do emphasize that
courts will continue to take a case-by-case approach. Unfortunately,
this mode of disposition will often manifest itself in seemingly incon-
sistent policy determinations. Indeed, in A quascutum the court labored
to channel the conduct of W&cJ into a category somewhere beyond that
of a mere shipper in order to justify the assumption of jurisdiction over
the English corporation. Yet, the Ferrante court adopted a conservative
stance by clinging to the jurisdictional nexuses of physical presence
and domestic execution of a contract despite the fourth-party defen-
dant's affect upon work to be performed in New York. Ironically, im-
pleader actions would appear to present more compelling reasons for
l The categorization of forwarders is derived from Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. &- P.R.R.
v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465, 484 (1949).
12 26 N.Y.2d 280, 258 N.E.2d 202, 309 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1970), aff'g 31 App. Div. 2d 355,
297 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Ist Dep't 1969). See also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Ray.
313, 320 (1969).
'3 26 N.Y.2d at 283-84, 258 N.E2d at 204, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
1970]
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sustaining jurisdiction in problematical cases: the agreement to in-
demnify could be deemed implicitly to include the burden of de-
fending in any forum where the indemnitee is forced to litigate.
Although Ferrante displays something of a jurisdictional paralysis,
Aquascutum suggests that the outer limits of CPLR 302(a)(1) are yet
to be reached.
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): 1 percent of gross income does not constitute "sub-
stantial revenue from interstate commerce."
Responding to the Court of Appeals decision in Feathers v. Mc-
Lucas,14 the Judicial Conference recommended passage' 5 of what is
now CPLR 302(a)(3).' 1 Although designed to afford protection to New
York residents injured within the state by foreign tortfeasors who could
not otherwise be reached under the long-arm statute,' 7 the restrictions
contained in this subsection are such that the courts have ample lati-
tude within which to safeguard the rights of nonresident defendants.'"
Gluck v. Fasig Tipton Co.19 provides a recent example of judicial un-
willingness to extend CPLR 302(a)(3) to the point where the burden
of defending an action in New York would be oppressive.
In Gluck the plaintiff alleged fraud and breach of warranty arising
out of the sale of a mare at an auction in Saratoga, New York. In
addition to the seller and the auctioneer, a Kentucky-based veterinar-
ian, who, allegedly, falsely certified the mare to be pregnant, was named
as a defendant. The latter's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
was granted despite plaintiff's contention that both CPLR 302(a)(2)
and (a)(3) provided the court with personal jurisdiction.
14 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
15 Report to the 1966 Legislature in Relation to the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
TWFLFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
12, 15, 17 (1967) [hereinafter TWELFTH REP.].
'6 CPLR 302(a)(3) states that a nondomiciliary will be subject to in personam juris-
diction in New York when he
commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, . . . if he . . . (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act
to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate
or international commerce....
17For example, under CPLR 302(a)(2) the tortious act must be committed within
the state. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See
generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 139-41 (1965).
18 In safeguarding the nonresident's rights, the New York courts are also protecting
a New York domiciliary since the "[e]nthusiasm for extending jurisdiction over foreign
persons . . . in limited contact cases, . . . may well be tempered by the expectation
that the same rule will be reciprocally applied in remote countries against our citizens
here." A. Millner Co. v. Noudar LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289, 294
(1st Dep't 1966).
19 63 Misc. 2d 82, 310 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
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